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Macro-Economic Equilibrium and Price Signal Accuracy in NonScalar Economy
Farzad Safaei, University of Wollongong, Australia
farzad@uow.edu.au
Abstract:
The management of global commons is of vital importance for modern society. The current
solutions attempt to internalize the cost of appropriation of commons by adding this to the cost of
private resources. In this paper we will show that this approach has some fundamental weaknesses.
To overcome these shortcomings, we have proposed to segregate the management of private and
shared resources by using non-scalar numbers for the underlying economic signals of money and
price. We prove that the resulting non-scalar economy always reaches a macro-economic
equilibrium point where the level of appropriation of commons by the society remains steady.
The second contribution of this paper is to show that the proposed design of the non-scalar
economy would guarantee the accuracy of price signal with respect to the appropriation of
commons. In other words, rational economic agents would ensure that the price neither
underestimates nor overestimates the actual level of appropriation incurred. This will provide a
powerful basis for an effective market system for the commons.

1.

Introduction

The world economy is now confronted with the scarcity of open access and non-excludable
resources such as the atmosphere and the oceans. While the current market economy is reasonably
effective in managing scarce resources that are privately owned, it lacks an inbuilt mechanism to
manage such shared resources. In particular, the cost of appropriation of these commons is external,
which results in over-exploitation. Most governments are now introducing incentive-based schemes,
such as effluent taxes or tradable permits, to confront the polluters with this negative externality
[1][2].
In these schemes, the cost of appropriation of commons is added to the cost of private resources.
Unfortunately, by lumping these costs together, a fundamental weakness is created because the
private and shared resources cannot be differentiated or managed independently. In the course of
market transactions, as one product is used as an input for another, the contribution of shared
resources is progressively obfuscated and swamped by other costs. The system, therefore, does not
maintain accurate information, and the signals and incentives within the economy are rather blunt
and cannot be targeted at specific objectives. In addition, damage to shared resources is cumulative,
and the system should possess some ‘memory’ to account for this. However, by mixing the costs of
private and shared resources, it would be difficult or impossible to keep an accurate account of the
appropriation of commons in isolation, hence, we would be forced to use the same management
model for both.
Development of a market economy that can manage private and shared resource independently
would be, in our view, a more effective approach. We propose to achieve this segregation using
non-scalar numbers for the underlying economic signals of money and price [3]. In this non-scalar
economy, money and price are represented by a duple such as x = (x1, x2). The first component x1 is
responsible for the management of privately owned resources and is called the Private Resource
Component (PRC). The second component x2, called the Shared Resource Component (SRC),
manages the scarcity of shared resources of interest.
We have proposed three core design elements for the non-scalar economy so that both private and
shared resources are efficiently allocated. This paper aims to provide an analysis of the non-scalar
economy with respect to two key issues:
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1- We demonstrate that the proposed non-scalar economy achieves a macro-economic
equilibrium, in which the level of SRC in circulation remains steady. This equilibrium level
can be controlled and is set only at the global level as a single global target.
2- The second contribution of this paper is to show that the proposed design of the non-scalar
economy would guarantee the accuracy of price signal with respect to the SRC. In other
words, rational economic agents would ensure that the SRC of the price neither
underestimates nor overestimates the actual level of appropriation incurred.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the nonscalar economy and its underlying design. Section 3 discusses the macro-economic equilibrium
point at the global and national levels. Section 4 develops a micro-economic model for all the
influences on the pricing decision of a firm to demonstrate price signal accuracy. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section 5.

2.

A Brief Overview of the Non-Scalar Economy

The rules that govern the behaviour of players in the ‘game of economy’ are tacitly encoded and
enforced in the underlying mathematical fabric of the system. For the non-scalar economy, we have
incorporated our objective using three core elements in its design:
1. A new definition for the purchase and sell operations,
2. The addition of a new constraint associated with shared resources, and
3. The ability to tighten this constraint in accordance with the diminishing capacity of shared
resources because of subtractibility.
This section briefly introduces these design choices and some of their ramifications. We focus only
on those concepts that are relevant to the aim of this paper.
2.1

Design Element 1: Purchase and Sell Operations

In the current economy, the purchase operation is a subtraction of price from the tendered money.
For example, if the buyer’s money before the purchase is $x and the price of the desired good is $a,
the cash register performs a subtraction operation y = x − a, where y is the remaining money after
the purchase. The purchase can take place provided y ≥ 0.
Our proposed purchase operation in the non-scalar economy is not a subtraction, but remains
mathematically simple. Let us assume that the buyer’s money before the purchase is a duple such as
$x = (x1, x2). The price of the desired good is another duple such as $a = (a1, a2). In order to obtain
$y = (y1, y2), which is the money left over after the purchase, the cash register in the non-scalar
economy uses the purchase operation y = x  a, where:
(y1, y2) = (x1, x2)(a1, a2) ≡ (x1 − a1, x2 + a2),

provided the result is valid money

(1)

The operand  denotes the purchase operation of money x on price a. As can be seen, y1 = x1 − a1.
In other words, private resources receive the same treatment as in the current economy. However,
y2 = x2 + a2, which means that buyers receive and accumulate their share of the appropriation of
commons via purchases.
The sell operation in the non-scalar economy is the reverse of purchase. In the above example, the
seller’s PRC would increase by a1 and his/her SRC would decrease by a2. Denoting the seller’s
money before and after the sale by z and w respectively, the sell operation is:
(w1, w2) = (z1, z2) ⓢ (a1, a2) ≡ (z1 + a1, z2 − a2),
2.2

provided the result is valid money

Design Element 2: Scarcity constraint associated with shared resources

The scalar purchase y = x − a can only take place if y ≥ 0. This restriction on the buying power is a
reflection of the scarcity of private resources ensuring that “I cannot consume more than I have
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earned”. We carry this constraint forward to the non-scalar economy. In other words, in Equation
(1) above, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for y = (y1, y2) to be valid money is that y1 ≥ 0.
We now need to develop a scarcity constraint for the shared resources. Note that the SRC of an
economic agent progressively increases because of the consumption of goods. This mimics the
accumulation of the corresponding pollution in the real world. The constraint on the SRC should
somehow enforce a limit on this growth. But it is not appropriate to impose an arbitrary upper limit
on the magnitude of the SRC of each agent. Therefore, for every money x = (x1, x2), we propose to
restrict a function of the SRC called the Shared Resource Index (SRI) of x, denoted by I (x) as
defined below:
⎧
x2
⎪
I(x) ≡ ⎨ x1 + x2
⎪ 0
⎩

if x2 > 0

(2)

if x2 ≤ 0

Clearly, the SRI of any x is confined between 0 and 1, and as x2 increases, the SRI approaches 1.
Our proposed scarcity constraint for shared resources is an upper limit on the value of SRI. This
limit is called the SRI Threshold and is a macroeconomic parameter set for each country, and
therefore imposed on all transactions therein, as described later.
We can now formally define the condition of validity of money in the non-scalar economy as
stipulated in Equation (1), which constitutes the second element of our design:
Definition I: In the non-scalar economy, money x = (x1, x2) is valid provided x1 ≥ 0
and I (x) ≤ λ, where {λ ∈  : 0 < λ ≤ 1} is the SRI Threshold imposed on x.

Consequently, the non-scalar purchase operation y = x  a can only take place if y satisfies both

Figure 1: Purchase operation and scarcity constraints, u can
purchase a, but v cannot.

conditions of validity specified in Definition I above. Otherwise, x does not have sufficient buying
power to purchase this good. This is shown in Figure 1, where I (x) = λ is a solid line in the twodimensional plane created by the two components of money. Valid money is only defined in the
region below and including this line. The purchase operation u  a can proceed in Figure 1,
because the result remains in the ‘valid money’ region. However, v cannot afford a, because the
SRI of (v  a) exceeds λ.
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If λ = 1, the scarcity constraint of shared resources is at infinity, i.e., shared resources are
considered abundant, and the non-scalar economy is ‘reduced’ to the current economy.
Marginal Cost of the SRC: In the scalar purchase y = x − a, the buying power of money x is
restricted because of the scarcity constraint y ≥ 0. If we define the buying power of x as “the number
of items at the unit price of $1.00 that can be purchased by $x”, then the buying power is trivially
equal to the magnitude of x. With non-scalar money, an analogous definition for the buying power
would be: “the number of items at the unit price of $a = (1.00, 0.00) that can be purchased by $x=
(x1, x2)”. With this definition, it can be observed in Figure 1 that if x2 ≤ 0, the buying power would
be equal to x1. However, if x2 > 0, the buying power of x would be less than x1 and can be obtained
by:

⎛1− λ⎞
Bλ (x) = x1 − ⎜
x
⎝ λ ⎟⎠ 2
Here, Bλ (x) denotes the buying power of x, where λ is the SRI Threshold imposed on x. Assuming
that λ is fixed, we can now quantify the impact of the SRC on the buying power of money:

∂ Bλ (x)
1− λ
, x2 > 0 and λ is a constant.
= − ρ, where ρ ≡
∂ x2
λ

(3)

We refer to parameter ρ in the above expression as the marginal cost of the SRC. This means that
for every extra dollar in the SRC, the buying power of money is reduced further by ρ dollars.
However, unlike pollution taxes or the cost of permits, the presence of the SRC neither reduces
one’s private resources nor provides revenue for some other entity. This is because the ownership of
the PRC, which is the source of buying power, has not changed hands, although some of the buying
power is no longer accessible. We say that the presence of the SRC locks up some of the buying
power of money. By reducing every dollar of SRC, ρ dollars of buying power would be unlocked
until the SRC becomes zero and the buying power reaches its maximum value of x1. In [3] we
showed that this property results in the creation of an environmental sector, which provides
‘environmental goods’ for sale. The environmental goods are produced by activities that restore the
shared resource to its original condition, similar to today’s offset schemes. The SRC of the price of
environmental goods is negative. Therefore, purchase of such goods would reduce the buyer’s SRC
and unlock some of the latent buying power in his/her wealth.
Accumulation of the SRC: Figure 2 shows the accumulation of the SRC in the economy of a
country such as Australia. The SRC enters the circulation through:
• Direct appropriation of shared resources by Australian people and firms, where new SRC is
created and transferred to the appropriator, and
• Import of goods from overseas, where SRC is transferred to the importer via purchase.
The SRC then circulates in the economy via the operations of purchase and sell. For every dollar of

Figure 2: Accumulation of the SRC in the non-scalar economy
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SRC in the economy, ρ dollars of buying power is locked up. Initially, this impact is small, but as
time goes on, more SRC enters circulation. This accumulation mirrors the real environmental
impact of the Australian economy on shared resources. If the accumulation were not stopped, the
economy would eventually come to a grinding halt; a reflection of the fact that the natural capacity
of shared resources would be exhausted. Investment in pollution abatement and a more judicious
choice of imports might reduce the rate of in-flow of SRC to Australia. There are also three avenues
for SRC to flow out of circulation as shown in Figure 2:
•
•
•

Natural discounting is applied to the whole economy at regular intervals to mimic the
regeneration capability of shared resources,
The export of goods to other countries, where the SRC is transferred to overseas buyers via
the sell operation, and
The efficient production and sale of environmental goods by the environmental sector.

It will be shown later that the economy always reaches an equilibrium point where the total SRC in
circulation stabilizes at a particular level. This equilibrium level is a function of λ.
2.3

Design Element 3: Tightening of the shared resource constraint

A fundamental difference between private and shared resources is that one’s appropriation of a
shared resource affects the capacity available to others. The marginal cost of further appropriation
would then depend on the size of the remaining capacity. Therefore, the marginal cost of
appropriation of commons is not a constant and depends on the history of appropriation. For
example, a particular polluting activity may indeed have negligible cost in a clean environment, but
if it occurs after centuries of pollution and as part of a large community of polluters, its impact may
no longer be ignored. The marginal cost of appropriation, therefore, must be an increasing function
of the total level of appropriation by the economy. The non-scalar economy provides the necessary
tools to achieve this goal because: (i) the economy keeps track of the appropriation of shared
resources automatically and accurately, and (ii) the marginal cost of the SRC can be controlled with
a single parameter.
Therefore, our third design element is:
The SRI Threshold (λ) imposed on each country must be a monotonically decreasing
function of the normalized level of SRC in circulation.
The normalized SRC in circulation for a country is shown as k in Figure 2. The normalization may
typically be on a per-capita basis but may also consider other factors such as the development stage
of the economy.
The consequence of our third design element is that, as more SRC is accumulated, λ is decreased,
signifying that the resource capacity has been diminished and the constraint associated with shared
resources is now tighter. Reduction of λ, in turn, increases the marginal cost of SRC ρ for everyone.
Therefore, SRC build-up is a public bad, both economically and in the real world. In the long run,
the accumulation of SRC in the economy has two effects: (i) it expands the market available to the
environmental sector, and (ii) the resulting increase in ρ would improve the returns of, and prompt
cooperative incentives to invest in, the environmental sector.

3.

Macro-Economic Equilibrium

Let us consider a non-scalar economy with a monotonically decreasing function for the SRI
Threshold imposed on it. We now show that such an economy will reach an equilibrium state if at
all feasible, that is, if the marginal cost is finite. The equilibrium point is defined as a state of
economy when the per-capita SRC in circulation is held at a constant level. The first order
condition for this point is that the marginal benefit of reducing per-capita SRC in circulation
becomes equal to its marginal cost. Below, we will derive an expression for these quantities.
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3.1

Marginal benefit of reducing per-capita SRC in circulation

The normalized level of SRC in circulation for a country is denoted by k in Figure 3. The SRI
Threshold λ should be a monotonically decreasing function of k based on our third design element.
In practice, this may be in the form of a step function, as shown in Figure 3, with re-evaluation and
imposition of a new threshold occurring at regular intervals such as on a quarterly basis. To
simplify analysis, let us assume a continuous case for which λ is decreased linearly as a function of
k at a particular rate of α. That is,

λ = 1 − α k;

0≤k<

1
α

(4)

The parameter α in the above equation determines how aggressively the SRI Threshold is adjusted
(lowered) in response to rising k, which in turn determines the length of time before the equilibrium
is reached as well as the actual equilibrium point.
Let the normalized cost of SRC as a function of k be L(k). Given that everyone’s SRI Threshold is
λ, then the per-capita cost of SRC, equal to the locked up buying power under λ, would be:
L(k) =

1− λ
k
λ

Hence, the marginal benefit of reducing k, denoted by ρ̂ is obtained by:

ρ̂ ≡

∂ L α k(2 − α k) 1 − λ 2
=
=
∂k
(1 − α k)2
λ2

(5)

For 0 < λ < 1, ρ̂ is always greater than the ρ derived via Equation (3). In other words, the marginal
cost of accumulation of SRC in one’s country is actually higher than the marginal cost of
accumulation of SRC in one’s own wealth. This disparity, which is the foundation of cooperative
incentives in the non-scalar economy, arises because any reduction in λ would increase ρ and this
change would be applied, retrospectively, to all the SRC accumulated in the past. In other words, ρ
is the short run marginal cost, which ignores the full impact of SRC accumulation on the country’s
economy in the long run.
3.2

Marginal cost of reducing per-capita SRC in circulation

As shown in Figure 2, the level of per-capita SRC in circulation k can be reduced by: (i) reducing

Figure 3: Variation of SRI Threshold in response to accumulation of SRC
in the economy

7
the rate of SRC in-flow to the economy by judicious choice of imports and abatement activity, and
(ii) removing some of the SRC from circulation by exports and environmental restoration. The
combination of abatement and environmental restoration could be viewed as an environmental good
offered by the environmental sector with a total price of
. This price indicates the efficiency
of the environmental sector in using privately owned resources to the value of e1 to reduce the SRC
by e2. Let us assume that environmental goods to the total value of
are required to keep
the per-capita SRC in circulation at a particular value k. Then the marginal cost (in terms of lost
buying power) of reducing k would be

.

The shape of this function cannot be ascertained at this stage and would depend on the efficiency of
the environmental sector, level of competition, spending on R&D and advancements in technology.
However, evaluation of this function would be quite feasible given the exact accounting information
readily available when the non-scalar economy is operational. It is reasonable to assume that this is
a decreasing function of k due to economies of scale and usually high establishment cost of
infrastructure for abatement and provisioning. In addition, as k approaches infinity, less effort
would be required to maintain the level of SRC in circulation.
3.3

The Equilibrium Point

Figure 4 shows the equilibrium points as the intersection points of a hypothetical marginal cost
function with three possible marginal benefit functions with different values of α. Clearly, the
marginal benefit of reducing k grows to arbitrarily large values in response to accumulation of SRC.

Figure 4: Equilibrium Points for different rates (α) of lowering SRI Threshold in response to
rising k

Hence, for any finite marginal cost and regardless of the shape of this function, there will be an
equilibrium point.
At the equilibrium point, there is no further accumulation of per-capita SRC. This does not imply
that improvements in the standard of living are stopped. It merely states that the environmental
sector grows with the economy or is becoming more efficient in reducing the polluting side effects
of generating wealth.
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3.4

Equilibrium point at the national and global levels

For the management of private resources, an economy needs external institutions to regulate and
enforce ownership rights. The shared resources are not owned by anyone, so property rights are not
needed. However, the economic system requires one piece of information to be supplied from
outside, namely the total capacity of shared resources. In the current schemes, this is achieved by
negotiating a set of national targets for emissions. In the non-scalar economy, only a single global
target for the total capacity is required and the market would determine the level of accumulated
SRC in various countries based on the comparative advantages of each economy. To illustrate the
point by a simple example consider Figure 5, which shows the SRC accumulation in the world
economy (“import” and “export” flows of Figure 2 are now internal transactions at the global
level). The world’s normalized SRC in circulation (k) can be controlled by choosing a suitable
model for the monotonic reduction of λ. A hypothetical set of such values is shown in the Figure.
This same function is then applied to all participating countries. Given the comparative advantages
of different economies, such as the strengths of their environmental sector, each country will have a
specific marginal cost curve and will achieve its own equilibrium point. The competitive and
cooperative incentives among participating economies would eventually lead to the desired global
equilibrium.

Figure 5: SRC accumulation in the world and national economies and an example
assignment of λ based on k

4.

Price Signal Accuracy

Figure 6 shows the SRC accumulation in a firm in the non-scalar economy. A firm may be directly
engaged in the appropriation of global commons, such as the discharge of waste into the atmosphere
or oceans. This direct appropriation is accounted for by the creation of new SRC, which is
transferred to the firm. Often more importantly, the firm also utilises shared resources indirectly,

9
through the purchase of inputs, such as electricity, raw materials, transport services and the like.
The SRC associated with these inputs is transferred to the firm via the purchase operation.

Figure 6: Accumulation of SRC in a firm

Some of the accumulated SRC may be transferred to the firm’s customers via the sell operation. If
the SRC of the price is properly set, there would be no build-up of the SRC in the long run and the
price signal would be accurate with respect to the appropriation of commons. However, the firm
has complete freedom in setting the price. For example, the firm can substitute SRC for PRC or vice
versa, because by reducing one dollar from the SRC and adding ρ dollars to the PRC of price, it
would receive the same buying power when the product is sold.
Nevertheless, we believe that the current design of the non-scalar economy is sufficient to ensure
that, with respect to the SRC, the price signal is costly-to-fake. To illustrate this point, in this
Section we develop a model for all the influences that would have an impact on the pricing decision
of a firm, incorporating the effects of both competitive and cooperative incentives.
4.1

Perception of price

Let us first develop a scalar quantity to measure how ‘expensive’ a two-dimensional price appears
to buyers. One possible approach is to use the amount of buying power lost due to purchase for this
purpose. Let us call this the ‘magnitude’ of the price. Using the definition of buying power
developed in Section 2, it can be shown that the magnitude of price a = (a1, a2) for a buyer with an
SRI Threshold of λ would be:
M λ (a) = a1 + ρ a2
(6)
Which means that:
∂ M λ (a)
1− λ
= ρ, where ρ ≡
∂ x2
λ
This result produces the same marginal cost of SRC (ρ) as Equation (3). Therefore, for every
additional dollar in the SRC of the price, the buyer perceives the item to be ρ dollars more
expensive, purely in terms of loss of buying power following purchase. Incidentally, the same
expression for the magnitude applies to sellers. That is, by selling an item priced at a = (a1, a2), the
seller gains Mλ (a) of buying power, where λ is the SRI Threshold imposed on the seller. If the
buyer and seller are under the same SRI Threshold, then the amount of buying power lost and
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gained during a transaction will be the same. In general, however, their SRI Thresholds may be
different and the two parties would have dissimilar views about the exchanged buying power. This
property is of unique importance in the non-scalar economy, and as discussed later, is relevant even
when buyers and sellers reside in the same country and nominally under the same SRI Threshold.
4.2

Pricing options available to the firm

For now, let us ignore the impact of competition and focus on a firm in isolation. In Figure 7, the
point â = (â1, a2) represents the average total cost incurred by producing a unit of output. The
horizontal line through this point, labelled AP, is the locus of all accurate prices (i.e., SRC = a2).
By setting the price at point a = (a1, a2), the sale of each unit of output returns a1 − â1 worth of
buying power regardless of the SRI Threshold λf imposed on the firm. However, the same buying
power would be returned if the price was set along the line labelled IMF, which is the line of
constant magnitude based on λf that goes through a. Any price point on this line above AP overestimates the SRC incurred by
production, but has less PRC than a1.
Therefore, some of the buying power
returned to the firm in this case is
indirect, due to the reduction of
accumulated SRC in the past. On the
other hand, any price on IMF below
the AP line under-estimates the SRC
incurred and its PRC is greater than a1.
Under this condition, the firm
accumulates SRC and, for every dollar
of SRC, ρ dollars of additional PRC
will have to be acquired, which
remains locked up. Eventually, the
accumulated SRC either has to be
transferred to future customers or Figure 7: Perspectives on prices by the firm and its customers
returned as a dividend to shareholders
(who are likely to be displeased).
Of course, the buying power of money and the magnitude of price, being scalar quantities, cannot
embody all the information contained in the non-scalar money and price. Some of the prices on the
IMF line, such as price points close to the PRC and SRC axes, will not be credible in the market. A
more accurate model could include a general concept of utility, which would result in a (non-linear)
curve similar to the indifference curve (locus of Ux1 dx1 + Ux2 dx2 = 0) to better represent the
perspectives of consumers and firms. For the purpose of our current discussion, however, the exact
shape is not critical and the above model is sufficient.
4.3

Competitive pressures

The competitive market in the non-scalar economy is similar to today’s free market model and
therefore, the prices of a firm are affected by competition and demand. In the current economy, all
else being equal, firms can only distinguish themselves by the magnitude of their prices. However,
the magnitude of non-scalar prices, as defined in Equation (6), may not be sufficient to model the
attitude of consumers. For example, assume that λ = 0.50 (ρ = 1.00), then both prices a = $(90, 10)
and b = $(10, 90) will have the same magnitude of $100. However, semantically, these represent
very different signals. More importantly, purchase at these prices would also have very different
economic consequences for the consumer.
A unique competitive pressure on the firm’s prices in the non-scalar economy is caused by the
environmental sector. To illustrate this point, let us assume that the equilibrium price of a unit of an
environmental good is e = $(e, −1.00). By purchasing this good, the buyer reduces $1.00 of his/her
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accumulated SRC and pays $e of PRC to compensate the environmental firm for the private
resources used in its operation. The net buying-power gain for the buyer is ρ − e. Given that
environmental goods are not consumables, rational agents would only consider buying these if,
among other things, ρ > e. Now consider the case when the firm wishes to reduce the SRC of its
price by $1.00 below the accurate value of a2 on the IMF line in Figure 7. The new (inaccurate)
price would be (a1 + ρ, a2 − 1.00). For the consumer, purchase at this price is equivalent to purchase
at (a1, a2) followed by the purchase of an environmental good priced at (ρ, −1.00). Similarly, setting
the SRC of the price $1.00 above the actual value on the IMF line results in (a1 − ρ, a2 + 1.00). For
the firm, this is equivalent to selling at (a1, a2) and then buying an environmental good at (ρ, −1.00).
In both cases, the price of the environmental good is not competitive because ρ > e. So the firm is
forced to consider a higher effective SRI Threshold compared to its actual (so that ρf ≈ e) if it wants
to set inaccurate prices, which reduces the return to the firm.
4.4

Cooperative pressures

The short run and long run marginal costs of SRC were derived in Equations 3 and 5 respectively.
The long run cost is always higher because the accumulation of SRC in one’s country results in a
reduction of λ for everyone. But although the changes in λ are imposed on all, the impact is
particularly great for those who posses significant levels of SRC.
To illustrate by a simple example, consider a firm in Australia that accumulated $10M of SRC in
the previous quarter as a result of inaccurate prices. Also assume that, during the previous quarter, λ
= 0.65 (ρ = 0.54), so the firm had to increase the PRC of its prices accordingly to receive an extra
$5.4M of PRC, which is now locked up against the accumulated SRC. Now suppose that, as a result
of accumulation of SRC in Australia (some of which might well have been contributed by this
firm), the SRI Threshold of Australia is lowered in this quarter to, say, λ = 0.62 (ρ = 0.61). This will
cause an increase in the locked-up buying power of this firm from $5.4M to $6.1M. Had the firm
adopted accurate prices, its buying power would not have been affected by this change in λ. In other
words, while the firm and its customers were nominally under the same SRI Threshold of λ = 0.65
in the previous quarter, the marginal cost of changes in λ was higher for the firm compared with its
customers, given its propensity to accumulate more SRC.
To illustrate this point, assume that the total wealth owned by an agent at a given time is x = (x1, x2).
Then the marginal of cost of changes in λ using the expression for buying power derived in Section
2 will be:

∂ Bλ (x) 1
= 2 x2
∂λ
λ
That is, the marginal cost of changes in λ is proportional to the level of accumulated SRC.
Consequently in the above example, although a typical customer could have used the short run
marginal cost (ρ) based on the current value of λ = 0.65, such a strategy would be quite myopic for
the firm.
Therefore, to be prudent, the firm that intends to set inaccurate SRC for its prices, would have to
include the possibility of a reduction in λ and adopt an effective threshold in the calculation of its
price, which is lower than the current value of λ. That is why, in Figure 7, the firm’s SRI Threshold
is shown to be lower than its customers’ (i.e., λf < λc) even when they are in the same country. In
this case, any price below the AP line would actually appear more expensive to customers (shaded
triangle in Figure 7).
4.5

Summary

We established in the previous subsections that competitive pressures would force the firm towards
the case of increasing its effective SRI Threshold (i.e., λf > λc), where λf and λc are effective SRI
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Thresholds felt by the firm and its customers respectively. On the other hand cooperative pressures
require reduction of the effective SRI Threshold (i.e., λf < λc). Hence, when both these pressures
are present, any deviation from accurate pricing will have a significant market cost for the firm.

5.

Conclusions

By adding the cost of appropriation of commons to the cost of private resources several weaknesses
are created in the economy:
1- There is a one-to-one correspondence – dollar for dollar – between private and shared
resources. To affect a change in behaviour, the assigned cost to the commons should be
comparable in magnitude to the cost of private resources used for abatement or restoration.
This requirement is artificial, unrealistic and difficult to justify. Evaluation of worth of
commons outside a proper market system that deals with these resources effectively is
fraught with difficulty and a source of controversy. In addition, this cost is not a constant
and depends on the existing context (level of appropriation) and the available capacity of the
resource.
2- The economy is not empowered to keep accurate account of appropriation of commons
because by mixing the two categories of resources, the contribution of shared resources is
obfuscated.
3- The price signal is blunt and lacks suitable information for the consumer with respect to
level of appropriation of commons incurred in production of good and services.
4- Damage to the environment may create revenue for some agents. For example, the
government may receive revenue through taxation or sale of permits. This could be a source
of perversion of incentives. In reality, the environmental degradation is a public bad and the
economy should model it as such.
This paper demonstrates that the proposed non-scalar economy addresses these issues effectively. In
the same order above:
1- The dollar value assigned to a unit of shared resources is not critical for the proper
functioning of the economy. Indeed, this can be viewed as choosing a currency unit: as long
as it is applied consistently the actual magnitude of the unit is immaterial. The real cost of
the appropriation of commons felt by the economic agents is the product of this unit and the
marginal cost of the SRC which is dependent on the context of accumulation of pollution.
2- Non-scalar economy keeps an accurate account of the appropriation of commons and has an
effective mechanism to modify the marginal cost of SRC in response to the accumulation of
pollution caused by the economy.
3- We have demonstrated that the price signal is accurate, that is, the SRC of the price can be
relied upon to accurately represent to total appropriation of shared resources in producing
the good or service. Moreover, the economic consequences of an inaccurate price are borne
by the firm.
4- There is no transfer of wealth and no revenue generation as a result of creation of new SRC
or transfer of SRC from one agent to another in the course of economic transactions. No one
benefits from accumulation of SRC, so there will be a strong cooperative incentive to
manage such accumulation in the economy.
5.1

Future work

We know from Coase theorem [4] that imposing the liability on the polluter (e.g., through taxation)
may not always lead to an efficient outcome. Another distinction of the competitive market in the
non-scalar economy is that the liability can be exchanged between the firm and its customers, which
might allow a Coasian resolution to improve the outcome.
Given the various categories of commons, e.g., atmosphere and the oceans, in reality there will be a
vector of SRC goods and it would be infeasible for every agent to face a vector of SRC prices.
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Therefore there must be an aggregation to a single overall price. One possible approach is to
maintain fixed relative prices among the various categories of commons. Any aggregation of prices
leads to some loss of information and creates substitution opportunities that may be considered a
weakness. Investigation of this issue will also be the subject of future publications.
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